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onditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become a popular and effective 
(see, for example, Paul Gertler 2004) mechanism for incentivizing academic 
participation. Given the number of programs, there is surprising little variation in 
their structure. Most are closely inspired by the popular Mexican Conditional Cash 
Transfer program previously known as PROGRESA and now OPORTUNIDADES. 
Under this program, students are paid on a monthly or bi-monthly basis for meeting 
a specified attendance (usually 80 percent per month) target.
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†
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Using a student level randomization, we compare three education-
based conditional cash transfers designs: a standard design, a design 
where part of the monthly transfers are postponed until children have 
to re-enroll in school, and a design that lowers the reward for atten-
dance but incentivizes graduation and tertiary enrollment. The two 
nonstandard designs significantly increase enrollment rates at both 
the secondary and tertiary levels while delivering the same atten-
dance gains as the standard design. Postponing some of the atten-
dance transfers to the time of re-enrollment appears particularly 
effective for the most at-risk children. (JEL H23, I21, I22, J13, O15)
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We test two simple variations on this basic model in the large municipality of 
Bogota, Colombia, both motivated by the need to prevent dropout from secondary 
schools and encourage matriculation at tertiary institutions. The first variant aims to 
relax families’ possible savings constraints, such as those due to commitment prob-
lems (see, for example, Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin 2006) or imper-
fect savings institutions. Such savings constraints might be particularly relevant in 
the education context because of the large expenses families face at the beginning of 
each new school year. To test the efficacy of this strategy, we compare a basic treat-
ment implemented in a manner very similar to PROGRESA (bi-monthly transfers for 
good attendance) to a “savings treatment” that varies the timing with which the funds 
are distributed to families. This treatment distributes two-thirds of the “good atten-
dance” funds on the same bi-monthly basis, but distributes the remaining funds for 
all months in a lump sum at the time the students are supposed to re-enroll in school.
The other variant directly provides incentives for graduation and tertiary enroll-
ment. In a second experiment, we evaluate a “tertiary treatment” that provides chil-
dren with the same lower bi-monthly transfers as the savings treatment, but then 
guarantees a large payment upon graduation. Students can then receive the payment 
sooner by matriculating to an institution of higher education.
In each experiment, we use an over-subscription model rather than the basic geo-
graphic allocation strategy used in most previous studies.
1 We staged a large recruit-
ment drive and randomly allocated 7,984 treatments to 13,433 registered children. 
This model allows us to randomize at the child-level, generating variation within 
schools and also within families.
We find that changing the structure of these programs can generate significant 
increases in re-enrollment without weakening incentives to attend, improvements 
that are largest for the poorest and most academically at-risk students. We find that 
all of the designs significantly increase attendance, generating gains of 3 to 5 per-
centage points. Despite the reduced bi-monthly transfers, the savings and tertiary 
treatments increase attendance rates by at least as much as the basic treatment. 
However, these two nonstandard treatments appear superior to the standard CCT 
payment structure when it comes to increasing enrollment rates at both the second-
ary and tertiary levels. Within secondary school, just postponing part of the transfer 
increases re-enrollment by 4 percentage points, while the basic treatment has almost 
no effect. The savings and tertiary treatments also increase matriculation rates at 
tertiary institutions. The savings treatment increases enrollment by 9.4 percentage 
points, while the tertiary treatment proves particularly effective, increasing matricu-
lation by 48.9 percentage points.
The difference in the performance of the basic and savings treatments is entirely 
driven by their effects on the most at-risk students. The savings treatment is espe-
cially effective at improving the enrollment of the lowest income students and the 
1 One exception is the system that the national Colombian government used to allocate school vouchers in the 
Program de Ampliacion de Cobertura de la Educacion Secunderia (PACES) program (see Joshua D. Angrist et al. 
2002; and Angrist, Eric Bettinger, and Michael Kremer 2006). While our use of this allocation strategy was a practi-
cal solution for conducting a student-level randomization, the intra-family variation in treatment provided by this 
strategy has direct policy implications for this and other allocation mechanisms that partially treat families, such as 
those treating only children of a particular age.VoL. 3 no. 2  169 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
students with the lowest participation rates. In comparison, the basic treatment has 
little effect on these students. This suggests that modifications in the structure of 
these interventions can also help target resources by better meeting the needs of 
those students most likely to drop out of school. The tertiary treatment performs 
similarly to the savings treatment and has a much more significant impact on stu-
dents who are least likely to re-enroll.
We also find some evidence that participation in CCTs may cause a worrisome 
reallocation of resources within the household. Siblings (particularly sisters) of 
treated students attend school less frequently and drop out more often than those 
in families that received no treatment. Overall, a student, who does not receive the 
treatment, but whose sibling does, attends 3 percentage points less, and is 7.3 per-
centage points less likely to re-enroll than a similar student whose sibling remains 
untreated. For girls, the differences are 5.3 and 10.4 percentage points, respectively. 
This is inconsistent with the view that families use the additional income generated 
by the CCT program to invest in the education of the nontreated children. In fact, 
families with a treated child appear to take educational opportunities away from the 
untreated siblings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the educational 
system in Bogota, Colombia (Section I). Next, we describe the research design, 
including the design of the individual treatments, the allocation process, the various 
datasets, and the statistical models (Section II). Section III provides our primary 
treatment effect estimates on monitored attendance and administrative enrollment. 
Section IV contains estimates of treatment effects on self-reported measures of 
academic participation and labor market activity from our follow-up survey. And 
Section V presents evidence of spillovers onto siblings. We conclude in Section VI.
I.  Education in Bogota
Colombia is a relatively typical middle income, Latin American country. Child 
mortality is relatively low at 21 per 1,000 births, and individuals can expect to live 
long lives. Life expectancy at birth is 72.6 years. The per capita income of Colombia 
is US$2,020, with only 17.8 percent of the population living on less than US$2 per 
day (World Bank 2006).
While the central government maintains control of curriculum as well as of the 
allocation of teachers and their wages, municipalities are primarily responsible for 
the administration of public education using national funds. The central government 
provides resources to municipalities, primarily from income and VAT taxes, and close 
to 90 percent of these funds are required by law to go toward health and education. 
With these funds, municipalities must develop, maintain, and run the facilities in 
their jurisdictions. Municipalities that have greater capacity to collect and administer 
taxes supplement central resources with local funds, usually from property taxes.
The academic year runs from the end of January until the middle of November. 
The  system  is  divided  into  three  categories:  basic  primary  (grades  1–5),  basic 
secondary (grades 6–9) and middle secondary (grades 10 and 11). After finishing 
the eleventh grade, children can matriculate to either traditional universities or one 
of many vocational schools. Children usually start school at five to seven years 170  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
of age and are legally required to attend school through the ninth grade, a period 
referred to as basic education.
Like in most urban areas in middle-income countries, school attendance is highest 
for younger children. The enrollment rate for students between ages 5 and 13 is close 
to 100 percent. After 13 years old, the attendance rate starts to decline. The average 
attendance rate for individuals of age 15 is 92 percent, aged 16 is 90 percent and age 
17 is 80 percent. The drop is faster for low-income individuals. For individuals fall-
ing into the bottom two categories of the Colombian poverty index (the SISBEN), 
the attendance rate for 15 year olds is 84 percent, for 16 year olds is 80 percent 
and for 17 year olds is 65 percent (Fedesarrollo 2005). Overall, in 2003, there were 
89,000 children between 5 and 18 years of age who were out of school. Seventy-
four percent of these were classified in the bottom two categories of the SISBEN 
(Fedesarrollo 2005).
When surveyed, students claim that the major reason for dropping out is the cost 
of education. Students have to pay to re-enroll each year. They also have to pay 
for required items like uniforms, books, and supplies. In fact, 64 percent of drop-
outs claim that the high cost of education is the main reason for leaving school 
(Fedesarrollo  2005).  Enrollment  fees,  uniforms,  and  school  materials  make  up 
90 percent of the costs for low-income individuals and cost between 24,000 and 
50,000 pesos (US$13 to US$22) depending on the school and grade. This is a large 
expense given that the poorest families in Bogota earn less than US$750 a year.
II.  Research Design
In 2005, the city of Bogota established the Conditional Subsidies for School 
Attendance (“Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistencia Escolar”) program in an 
effort to increase student retention, lower drop-out rates, and reduce child labor.
2 
Hoping to improve the program over the basic conditional cash transfer model, 
the Secretary of Education of the City (Secretaria de Educacion del Distrito, SED) 
decided to implement a pilot study in 2 of the 12 localities in the city. The pilot was 
to run for a year, and then the results would be used to inform the design of the final 
program that would operate city-wide.
3
A. design of Treatments
Ultimately, three interventions were chosen for the pilot. First, operating as a refer-
ence is a basic intervention similar to that used in PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES. 
In this basic model, participants would receive 30,000 pesos per month (approxi-
mately US$15) as long as the child attended at least 80 percent of the days that 
2 This program is distinct from Familias en Accion. Familias en Accion is a nationally run Colombian con-
ditional cash transfer program, modeled closely on PROGRESA, that incentivizes both school participation and 
health care. At the time that this project was conducted, the program was not functioning within Bogota. See Orazio 
Attanasio et al. (2005, 2010) for a more complete description of the program.
3 The design of the individual treatments was a collaborative effort between the authors and city officials. The 
goal was to design variations in the standard treatment that were roughly cost equivalent for a student starting the 
program in grade six and that could be feasibly administered city-wide when the program was scaled up.VoL. 3 no. 2  171 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
month. Based on the responses to our surveys, the total annual value of the trans-
fer (300,000 pesos) is three times more than what students report, on average, in 
labor market earnings, and is slightly more than the average 250,000 pesos that 
families report spending each year on educational expenses. The payments would 
be made bi-monthly through a dedicated debit card run by one of the major banks in 
Colombia. Students would be removed from the program if they failed to matricu-
late to the next grade twice, failed to reach the attendance target in two successive 
bi-monthly periods, or were expelled from school. Finally, all payments would be 
based on reports provided to the Secretary of Education by the students’ principals.
The two additional treatments were experimental variants of this basic interven-
tion aiming to better reach the goals of the program, while keeping the cost of each 
intervention roughly equivalent to the basic intervention.
4 Based on research that 
suggests that families may face difficulties saving money for students’ education 
(either because of intra-household bargaining, personal discounting issues, or other 
high costs of savings), the second treatment (savings treatment) varied the timing 
of the distributions to students’ families. Instead of receiving 30,000 pesos a month 
for reaching the attendance target, students were paid two-thirds of this amount on a 
bi-monthly basis (20,000 pesos or US$10), while the remaining one-third was held 
in a bank account. The accumulated funds were then made available to students’ 
families during the period in which students prepare to enroll for the next school 
year. If students reached the attendance target every month, this treatment would 
make 100,000 pesos (US$50) available to them in December.
5
While keeping the overall cost of the intervention roughly similar to the basic 
treatment, the savings treatment differs from the basic intervention with respect to 
both short-term liquidity constraints and the technology available to save for longer 
term goals. Because the monthly transfer is reduced, children may attend school 
less often if their family faces very immediate liquidity constraints, forcing them 
to trade off time spent in school with time spent at work, for example. However, if 
families’ long-term savings constraints are more significant for children’s academic 
participation than the more short-term liquidity constraints, the savings treatment 
could generate as high attendance rates and higher re-enrollment rates than the basic 
treatment, as families receive all the accrued funds at the time they need money to 
start a new school year.
6
The third treatment (tertiary treatment) changes the outcomes upon which stu-
dents are being incentivized. Instead of only providing an incentive to attend school, 
this treatment also provides an incentive to graduate and matriculate to a higher 
education institution. Like in the savings treatment, in the short term, the monthly 
transfer for good attendance is reduced from 30,000 pesos per month to 20,000 
4 The amounts are not exactly the same because the treatments do not account for inflation. However, the infla-
tion rate in 2005 was 4.85 percent, and the net effect of this difference is to reduce the value of the savings treatment 
which, we will show, is more effective than the basic treatment despite the slightly lower value.
5 Subsequent payment of delayed subsidies was not conditional on future attendance. So, if a student earned the 
subsidy in February but never again met the 80 percent target, the student would still receive the “saved” fraction of 
the February payment at the end of the calendar year.
6 This effect would be similar to the effect observed in Esther Duflo, Kremer, and Jonathan Robinson (2009) in 
which simply offering farmers the option to buy fertilizer at harvest time, when money was available, significantly 
increased the purchase of fertilizer.172  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
pesos. However, in this case, there is no remaining third being held in an account: 
the financial reward for good attendance in a given month is being reduced by 1/3. 
However, upon graduating the student earns the right to receive a transfer of 600,000 
pesos (US$300), amounting to 73 percent of the average cost of the first year at a 
vocational school (823,000 pesos or US$412). If the student enrolls in a tertiary 
institution, she receives the transfer immediately; if she fails to enroll upon gradua-
tion, she receives the transfer after a year has passed.
Compared to the basic treatment, this tertiary treatment could reduce attendance 
rates by lowering the reward for attendance if students’ short-term liquidity con-
straints are important (as in the savings treatment). On the other hand, because of 
the graduation incentives, the tertiary treatment could stimulate higher re-enrollment 
and graduation rates and possibly higher attendance rates (if attendance is viewed as 
a relevant input into graduation); it could also result in higher levels of matriculation 
to tertiary institutions. One should note though that, unlike the savings treatment, 
the tertiary treatment is only cost-equivalent to the basic treatment from the perspec-
tive of a student going through six years of secondary education. In the pilot data we 
analyze below, this treatment ends up being more generous than the basic treatment 
because it is applied to students that are three years or less from graduation.
B. structure of randomization
As required by the SED, the assessment of the treatments was divided into two sep-
arate experiments located in two very similar localities in Bogota, San Cristobal, and 
Suba.
7 Eligible registrants in San Cristobal, ranging from grade 6–11, were randomly 
assigned between a control group, the basic treatment, and the savings treatment. The 
tertiary treatment was evaluated separately in an experiment in Suba, where students 
ranging from grade nine through eleven, were randomly assigned to either the tertiary 
treatment or a control group. Hence, while we can experimentally estimate the causal 
effect of the tertiary treatment, we can only identify its relative effect compared to the 
basic (or saving treatment) by relying on a rich set of socio demographic controls and 
school-level fixed effects rather than purely random variation.
8
Both experiments were based on an over-subscription model. The city guar-
anteed enough funds to provide 7,984 students with the subsidies, 6,851 in the 
basic-savings experiment in San Cristobal and 1,133 in the tertiary experiment in 
Suba, for three years. A publicly advertised registration process was held in each 
locality. Given that there were more interested children than subsidies, the subsi-
dies were allocated to children based on a lottery.
9,10
7 It was the SED’s decision to segregate the evaluation of the tertiary treatment into a single, smaller locality 
within Bogota because this treatment was more expensive (for students in grades 9–11).
8 The pilot also included two additional experiments whose results are not included in this article due to space 
constraints. First, the basic treatment was also randomly assigned to students in Suba, but only those in grades 
six through eight. Second, in both localities, out-of-school children were randomly assigned to a special program 
designed to facilitate their re-enrollment into school.
9 The over subscription and recruitment process are similar to the techniques used in the assignment of school 
vouchers in the PACES program implemented nationally in Colombia. This process is described in Angrist et al. 
(2002).
10 One potential concern with random assignment at the child level is that the treatment may spillover between 
children  through  peer  networks.  In  estimates  that  are  not  presented  in  this  draft,  we  have  investigated  this   VoL. 3 no. 2  173 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
In January and early February 2005, the program was advertised in the two locali-
ties through posters, newspapers ads, radio spots, loudspeakers in cars, churches, 
and community leaders, including principals of schools and priests. Potential can-
didates for the subsidy were registered during a 15 day period between the end of 
February and the beginning of March 2005. The registration was conducted in vari-
ous schools of the two localities. Families were not aware at the time of registration 
of the existence of different treatments. The conditional transfers were advertized as 
incentives to participate in school with an annual value equal to at least the annual 
value of the basic treatment.
In order to be considered for the program, at least one parent or guardian was 
required to be present at the registration. In order to be eligible for the program, chil-
dren had to meet several criteria. First, the potential candidates had to have finished 
grade 5 for the basic-savings experiment and grade 8 for the tertiary experiment and, 
for both, had to be enrolled but not yet graduated from grade 11. Also, the children’s 
families had to have been classified into the bottom two categories on Colombia’s 
poverty index, the SISBEN.
11 To verify the classification, the student had to present 
an identification card (which the vast majority of students have). The SISBEN catego-
rization of the household was confirmed online by the SED at the time of registration. 
Finally, in order to eliminate the possibility that families would move to take advan-
tage of the program, only those households that had been classified by the SISBEN 
system as living in San Cristobal or Suba prior to 2004 were eligible to participate 
in the program. In total, 13,433 eligible students were registered for the two experi-
ments: 10,907 for the basic-savings experiment and 2,526 for the tertiary experiment.
The  randomization  was  publicly  conducted  on April  4  in  each  locality. The 
research team conducted the actual lottery, but in order to ensure transparency of 
the process, the code was inspected prior to the exercise by researchers from the 
National University. The randomizations were done publicly (projecting the code 
onto a screen), with representatives of the community, school, and local authorities 
present. The lists of beneficiaries were immediately printed, signed by local offi-
cials, and made available to the communities so that parents were able to determine 
if their children were included.
The randomization was stratified on locality, type of school (public/private), 
gender, and grade level. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the distribution of children 
by grade, gender, and experimental group. In all, 6,851 students from San Cristobal 
and 1,133 from Suba received one of the treatments. This left 4,056 control students 
in San Cristobal and 1,393 in Suba.
possibility. The baseline survey contained information on children’s peers. Using this information, we confirmed 
first that children in the treatment and control groups have both similar networks and are connected to the same 
number of treated children. Thus, any indirect treatment effect would be equally distributed across the two groups. 
Second, however, we also document that there is no effect of a child being friends with a treated child—either over-
all or among the treatment or control students individually. These results are available upon request.
11 See Carlos Eduardo Vélez, Elkin Castaño, and Ruthanne Deutch (1999) for a more detailed description of 
SISBEN. The SISBEN classified households according to six levels, one being assigned to the poorest. Most of the 
families in these areas were surveyed in 2003 and 2004.174  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
C. data
The data come from six sources. First, we have data from the original SISBEN 
surveys of 2003 and 2004, which contain information on all the families that were 
eligible to register for the lottery. These data are subsets of the actual surveys that 
were used to create the SISBEN national poverty index. We have access to infor-
mation on all individuals placed into the bottom two SISBEN categories, provid-
ing a rich baseline description of all of the eligible families. Among the variables 
included in the SISBEN data are family-level characteristics such as schooling level 
of the household head, physical characteristics of the dwelling, employment status 
of adults, and household income, as well as individual-level variables such as school 
enrollment status at the time of the survey, age, income, and marital status.
12
The second source of data comes from the program registration process itself. 
During this process families had to provide some basic information on the students 
to ensure eligibility. These data include birth date, gender, last grade completed, 
12 The challenge of using these data is that families knew that they were being surveyed for the purpose of scor-
ing them on a poverty index. As a result, measures of assets and income are probably underestimates of the true 
values. However, this bias is almost certainly not correlated with the differences investigated in this paper given the 
timing and purpose of the survey. We use this information for two primary purposes. First, we use it to compare 
registrants to non-registrants, and second, we use it as a source of information on the households to which the 
children in the study belong.
Table 1—Distribution of Subjects by Research Groups
Basic-Savings  Tertiary 
Control  Basic  Savings  Control  Tertiary  Total
Panel A. All registrants
Grades 6–8  2,439 2,062 2,059 0 0 6,560
Grades 9–10  1,243 1,051 1,051 1,046 851 5,242
Grade 11  374 314 314 347 282 1,631
Female  1,986 1,681 1,680 616 502 6,465
Male  2,070 1,746 1,744 777 631 6,968
Total students  4,056 3,427 3,424 1,393 1,133 13,433
Panel B. All registrants in schools selected for attendance monitoring and surveying
Grades 6–8  1,362 1,232 1,198 0 0 3,792
Grades 9–10  734 663 610 503 427 2,937
Grade 11  197 177 169 166 131 840
Female  1,108 1,016 954 278 230 3,586
Male  1,185 1,056 1,023 391 328 3,983
Total students  2,293 2,072 1,977 669 558 7,569
Panel c. All registrants in selected schools and covered in baseline survey
Grades 6–8  1,189 1,215 1,166 0 0 3,570
Grades 9–10  643 633 586 449 425 2,736
Grade 11  179 188 177 160 148 852
Female  964 1,014 929 248 237 3,392
Male  1,047 1,022 1,000 361 336 3,766
Total students  2,011 2,036 1,929 609 573 7,158
notes: This table displays the distribution of subjects within the various research groups. Panel A contains all stu-
dents in the study. Panel B contains those students in the schools that were chosen for attendance monitoring and 
surveying. This includes the 68 schools with the greatest number of students registered for the lottery. Of the stu-
dents in the selected schools, panel C contains the students that were captured in the baseline survey. See online 
Table A2, in the online Appendix, for a comparison of students found in the baseline to those that were not.VoL. 3 no. 2  175 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
and year in which that grade was completed. Most of this information was verified 
through the actual SISBEN database and when possible, the SED’s official records.
We also obtained administrative records from the SED that include the enroll-
ment records of every child in a public school and most private schools in the two 
localities. These data, combined with the demographic data from SISBEN and reg-
istration datasets, allow us to assess the effect of the treatments using every student 
that registered for the randomization. The only students not included in this dataset 
are students who attended a school that did not report enrollment information to the 
SED or students for whom there was insufficient information in either set of records. 
Indeed, we were able to match the enrollment status for all but 9.3 percent of the 
students in the experiment from San Cristobal and 8.5 percent from Suba, and the 
students for whom a match was not possible were equally divided between the vari-
ous research groups. On average the difference in match rates between the groups 
was less than half of a percentage point.
13
Students within the study were spread across 251 schools, but the density 
was heavily skewed with the majority of students in a small number of schools. 
Given the budget constraints, we chose to collect baseline data and subsequent 
attendance data in only the 68 schools with the largest number of registered chil-
dren. This implied a total possible sample of 7,569 children. The distribution of 
these children by grade, gender, and experimental group is provided in panel B 
of Table 1.
We collected attendance data during the last quarter of 2005 through direct obser-
vation. For this purpose, the team assembled a group of assistants who randomly 
visited schools and classes. The assistants directly called the roll of all students, 
and students were marked absent if they were not physically present in the class-
room. They visited a total of 1,069 classes in the 68 selected schools for 13 weeks. 
Attendance data were collected on all 7,569 students.
Finally, we conducted both a baseline and follow-up survey on these students 
in these 68 schools. The baseline was conducted between May and July 2005 and 
comprised a simple self-administered survey that the students filled out in class. 
The coverage rate of this survey was very high. Of the 7,569 students that were 
selected for surveying, 7,158 completed the baseline survey. The distribution of 
these students is provided in panel C of Table 1. Reassuringly, their distribution 
across grades, gender, and experimental groups is similar to that for the original 
registrants (panel A of Table 1).
14
The follow-up survey was conducted in February and March 2006. To ensure that 
the survey did not preferentially treat students still enrolled in school, we conducted 
the survey at the household level. For the follow-up, the research team located the 
families of 98 percent of baseline students overall, 98 percent in San Cristobal and 
13 In San Cristobal, 9.3 percent of the control children were not matched while 0.41 percent more children in 
the basic treatment were not matched (the standard error is 0.75 percentage points) and 0.25 less students in the 
savings treatment were not matched (the standard error is 0.81 percentage points). In Suba, 8.4 percent of control 
children could not be matched, and in the tertiary treatment group 0.28 percentage points more students could not 
be matched (the standard error is 1.27 percentage points).
14 In the online Appendix, we provide a careful comparison of the students who provided a baseline survey 
compared to those who did not (Table A2), and report average characteristics of children across research groups for 
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99 percent in Suba. Both the attrition rates and the distribution of attriting students’ 
characteristics were similar across the research groups (see online Appendix Table 
A4).
D. Analytic models
We use a simple difference model that makes comparisons between different sub-
sets of the sample without controlling for any covariates. These comparisons are 
intended to assess the comparability of different groups, such as the research groups, 
registrants, and nonregistrants, etc. For the basic-savings experiment, for example, 
the specification takes the following form:
(1)    y​ ij  ​=​​ β​ o  ​+​​ β​ B  Basi  c​ i  ​+​​ β​ s   saving  s​ i  ​+​​ ε​ ij   .
The variable   y​ ij   represents a particular characteristic or outcome for child i in school 
j. This is regressed on the variables Basi  c​ i   and saving  s​ i  , which are indicator vari-
ables for whether or not the child is in the respective treatment group. The error vari-
able   ε​ ij   is indexed with both student and school identifiers because the error terms 
are allowed to co-vary up to the school level. We also use a difference estimator that 
controls for socio-demographic and school characteristics. For the basic-savings 
experiment, this model is specified as follows:
(2)    y​ ij  ​=​​ β​ o  ​+​​ β​ B  Basi  c​ i  ​+​​ β​ s  saving  s​ i  ​+​δ​ X​ ijk  ​+​​ ø​ j  ​+​​ ε​ ij   .
The variables from equation 1 are defined as before.   X​ ijk   is a vector of socio-demo-
graphic controls for child i in school j and family k; and   ø​ j   are school fixed effects. 
We, again, allow the error terms to co-vary up to the school level. We use similar 
specifications for the tertiary treatment.
The socio-demographic controls include indicators for the households’ owner-
ship of assets, access to utilities, possession of durable goods, and physical infra-
structure of the house. The child characteristics include age, gender, marital status, 
years of education, number of years too old (or young) the child is for her grade, 
and an indicator for whether or not the child is older than normal for her grade. At 
the family level, we also control for the marital status of the head of household, the 
head’s age and education level, the number of people in the household, the number 
of children in the household, the household income, the family’s SISBEN score, and 
a geographic poverty index called the “estrato.” We use the same list of controls in 
all the regressions that include socio-demographic controls.
E. Baseline comparison
As a check that the randomization created balanced research groups, we com-
pare students assigned to the research groups using the information available in the 
SISBEN survey. All of this information was collected prior to the randomization, 
and thus, students in each research group should, on average, have similar charac-
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The results are presented in Table 2, where we use equation (1) to compare stu-
dents in each research group using both individual- and household-level character-
istics. Most of the estimated differences are too small to be statistically significant. 
And, even the few statistically significant differences we observe are economically 
quite small. For example, the savings treatment group has heads of households with 
two-tenths of a year less education than those of the control group. Also, the basic 
treatment group scores slightly higher than the control group on a household pos-
sessions index, while the savings group scores slightly higher than the control group 
on access to utilities. Overall, we make 60 comparisons and find 7 differences that 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, 5 at the five percent level, and 2 at 
the 1 percent level, consistent with what one would expect from random assignment.
We  also  performed  similar  comparisons  using  just  the  68  schools  that  were 
selected for attendance monitoring and find similar results. These comparisons are 
available in online Appendix Table A1.
III.  Primary Results: Attendance and Re-enrollment
A. Attendance
Table 3 compares attendance rates across experimental groups, using the moni-
tored attendance data that was collected toward the end of the 2005 academic year. 
The first three columns show the results for the basic-savings experiment, while the 
second three columns contain the comparisons for the tertiary experiment. Column 
7 pools the data for students in grades 9–11 to allow a comparison of the treatment 
effects across all three treatments. The estimated treatment effects are in rows 1–3, 
and the test statistics from comparisons of the relative treatment effects are provided 
in rows 4 and 5. For the enrollment effects presented in the next section and in Table 
4, we restrict the sample to those students in grades 6–10 (because those in grade 11 
should graduate rather than re-enroll). To be consistent, we exclude students in grade 
11 from these estimates as well.
15
We start with a discussion of the basic-savings experiment. Column 1 provides 
simple difference estimates of the treatment effect using the equation (1). We see 
that the basic treatment increases attendance by 3.3 percentage points (significant 
at the one percent level), while the savings treatment increases attendance by 2.9 
percentage points (also significant at the one percent level). Both interventions are 
effective, and there is no evidence that the savings treatment is less effective than the 
basic treatment at boosting attendance, despite the lower monthly payments. In col-
umns 2 and 3, we estimate the same treatment effects using equation (2) by adding 
first socio-demographic controls and then school fixed effects. As expected given 
the random assignment tests presented in Table 2, the estimated treatment effects in 
columns 2 and 3 are similar to those in column 1.
Columns 4–6 of Table 3 report the equivalent estimates for the tertiary experi-
ment. Recall that the tertiary treatment provides the same monthly payment for good 
15 Adding students from grade 11 to these estimates does not change the results.178  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
attendance as the savings treatment, but, unlike in the savings treatment, there are 
no delayed transfers here but instead a plain reduction in the direct reward for good 
attendance. In each specification, the estimated treatment effect is an increase in 
enrollment of a little more than 5 percentage points (significant at the 1 and 5 percent 















Panel A. indexes of household assets
Possessions 1.9 0.07*** 0.04 0.03 1.94 −0.05
(1.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (1.02) (0.04)
Utilities 4.65 −0.02 0.06** −0.08** 4.85 0.04
(1.42) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (1.32) (0.04)
Durable goods 1.37 −0.02 0.01 −0.03 1.63 0.02
(0.89) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.86) (0.03)
Physical infrastructure 11.65 −0.05 0.04 −0.09** 12.14 −0.05
(1.75) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (1.49) (0.06)
Panel B. individual characteristics
Age 14.38 0.09 −0.06 0.16 15.67 −0.06
(5.30) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (4.23) (0.19)
Gender 0.5 0 0 0.01 0.45 −0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.50) (0.02)
Years of education 5.61 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 7.43 −0.05
(1.86) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (1.34) (0.05)
Panel c. Household characteristics
Single head 0.3 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.01
(0.46) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.44) (0.02)
Age of head 45.92 −0.07 0.11 −0.19 46.21 0.21
(10.27) (0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (8.59) (0.30)
Years of ed., head 5.65 −0.11 −0.18*** 0.07 5.94 −0.13
(2.94) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (2.94) (0.09)
People in household 5.42 −0.04 −0.03 −0.02 5.16 −0.01
(2.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (1.78) (0.07)
Member under 18 2.57 0.03 0.01 0.01 2.31 0.05
(1.35) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (1.20) (0.06)
Panel d. Poverty measures
Estrato 1.44 −0.01 0.02 −0.03* 1.63 −0.01
(0.83) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.77) (0.03)
SISBEN score 11.76 −0.11 −0.02 −0.1 13.44 0.03
(4.64) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (4.33) (0.18)
Household income 366.7 −4.73 −0.35 −4.37 402.03 3.18
​ (1,000 pesos) (241.01) (5.77) (6.17) (6.64) (235.44) (7.67)
notes: This table presents a comparison of students in each of the listed research groups. Columns 1 and 5 con-
tain the average characteristics of the respective control students, while columns 2, 3, 4, and 6 contain the average 
difference between the respective control students and treatment students. Panel A contains indices of household 
assets (positive values indicate wealthier families). Panel B contains individual student characteristics, and Panel C 
contains characteristics of the students’ families. Panel D contains poverty measures available in the SISBEN data-
set. This includes the “estrato” number, which is a geographic measure of poverty, as well as the SISBEN score, 
which is a continuous score used to classify households for various social programs. Standard errors are clustered 
at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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level depending on the specification). A direct comparison of the three programs 
is attempted in column 7 where we estimate equation (2) with both demographic 
controls and school fixed-effects on a sample that includes all Suba students and the 
subset of San Cristobal students that are in grades 9–11.
16 This specification confirms 
that the point estimate on the tertiary treatment effect is actually larger than that on 
the other treatments when estimated on similar samples. However, the difference is 
not statistically significant (p-value of 0.18 when compared with the basic treatment).
In summary, while both the savings and tertiary treatments might have hurt 
monthly attendance because of the more binding short-term liquidity constraints 
they impose on participating families (compared to the basic CCT), we find no evi-
dence of this in the data. Furthermore, while the tertiary treatment provides lower 
direct rewards for good attendance (but possibly indirect rewards by incentivizing 
graduation), this treatment appears no less effective than the other two treatments in 
getting children to come to school every day.
16 It is important to note that the comparison between the tertiary treatment and the other two treatments is not 
experimental. While the estimated treatment effects for all of the treatments are experimentally based, the compari-
son to the tertiary treatment occurs across experiments. Thus, unlike the comparison between the basic and savings 
treatments, differences between the other treatments and the tertiary treatment could be due to unobserved hetero-
geneity in treatment effects despite controlling for a common set of demographic characteristics.
Table 3—Effects on Monitored School Attendance Rates
Basic-Savings  Tertiary  Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basic treatment  0.033***  0.032***  0.032*** 0.025**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
Savings treatment 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
Tertiary treatment 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.056** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
H0: Basic—Savings
  f-Stat  0.31 0.4 0.48 0.05
  p-value 0.58 0.53 0.49 0.82
H0: Tertiary—Basic
  f-Stat 1.87
  p-value 0.18
Demographic controls √ √ √ √ √
School fixed effects √ √ √
Observations 5,799 5,799 5,799 930 930 930 2,937
r
2  < 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.27 0.13
Control average 0.792 0.792 0.792 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.786
notes: This table displays the estimated effects of the respective treatments on students’ monitored attendance rates. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 contain estimates of the effects of the basic and savings treatments in San Cristobal in grades 
6–10. Columns 4, 5, and 6 contain estimates of the treatment effect for the tertiary treatment in Suba for grades 
9 and 10. Column 7 contains estimates of the effects of all three treatments on students in grades 9 and 10 for all 
localities. Control variables include all variables listed in Table 2, the square of the child’s age, the number of years 
too old a child is for his or her grade, and indicator variables for the child’s marital status, the family’s marital sta-
tus, grade, and whether or not the child is over the average age for his or her grade. Standard errors are clustered 
at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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B. re-enrollment
We next compare the enrollment rates of students in each research group for 
the 2006 academic year. These results are presented in Table 4. The layout of 
this table is identical to that of Table 3.
17 As in the previous section, we use only 
students in grades 6–10, since students in grade 11 should have graduated in the 
previous year (we study graduation and tertiary enrollment outcomes in Table 7).
Recall that in the basic-savings experiment, one-third of the bi-monthly pay-
ments for good attendance were held in an account until just before the begin-
ning of the next academic year, with the expectation that this might help families 
face enrollment related expenses. This seems to have happened. The savings 
treatment significantly increases enrollment by about 4 percentage points (sig-
nificant at the one percent level), while the basic treatment seems to increase 
enrollment by only 1.1 to 1.7 percentage points depending on the specification. 
17 For these estimates, we use data from all of the children in the study, rather than just the 68 schools selected 
for attendance monitoring. In results not included in this draft (but available upon request), we perform similar 
estimates using only students from the 68 schools. We find a similar pattern of results.
Table 4—Effects on Administrative Enrollment in Following Year
Basic-savings  Tertiary  Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Basic treatment  0.017*  0.016*  0.011 0
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016)
Savings treatment 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.030*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017)
Tertiary treatment 0.042* 0.039* 0.037* 0.042**
(0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
H0: Basic—Savings
  f-Stat  3.99 3.94 5.52 2.28
  p-value 0.048 0.049 0.02 0.13
H0: Tertiary—Basic
  f-Stat 2.23
  p-value 0.14
Demographic controls √ √ √ √ √
School fixed effects √ √ √
Observations 8,980 8,980 8,980 1,735 1,735 1,735 4,775
r
2  < 0.01 0.05 0.17 < 0.01 0.08 0.26 0.21
Control average 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.733
notes: This table displays the estimated effects of the respective treatments on students’ administrative enrollment 
rates. Columns 1, 2, and 3 contain estimates of the effects of the basic and savings treatments in San Cristobal in 
grades 6–10. Columns 4, 5, and 6 contain estimates of the treatment effect for the tertiary treatment in Suba for 
grades 9 and 10. Column 7 contains estimates of the effects of all three treatments on students in grades 9 and 10 
for all localities. The sample includes all students registered for the lottery except for students for whom not enough 
information was available to match the experimental data with the administrative data. (Only 9.2 percent of students 
fall into this category, equally distributed across treatment groups. The results are available upon request). Control 
variables include all variables listed in Table 2, the square of the child’s age, the number of years too old a child 
is for his or her grade, and indicator variables for the child’s marital status, the family’s marital status, grade, and 
whether or not the child is over the average age for his or her grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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The difference in magnitude of treatment effects is statistically significant at the 
5 percent level.
Turning next to the tertiary experiment in columns 4–6, we find that the tertiary 
treatment increases enrollment by 3.7 percentage points. Despite the similar point 
estimate to the savings treatment, the effect is only statistically significant at the 10 
percent level, probably due to the small sample size. Comparing the effect to that 
of the basic treatment in grades 9–10, the effect of the tertiary treatment is larger, 
by 4.2 percentage points (the basic treatment has no effect on these students), but 
the p-value of the f-statistic for a test of the equality of the treatment effects has a 
p-value of 0.14.
How do these effects compare to prior research on the enrollment effects of 
conditional cash transfers? Such a comparison is complicated by differences in 
methodology and target populations across programs. For example, most con-
ditional cash transfer programs provide noneducation forms of assistance along 
with educational incentives (usually for nutrition or health care) and are targeted 
at more rural populations of students in primary and lower secondary school (usu-
ally grades 1–8).
Keeping these caveats in mind, our estimates of the impact of the savings and 
tertiary treatments on secondary enrollment are in the same range as those measured 
in other contexts. For example, within the context of the experimental evaluations, 
Paul Glewwe and Pedro Olinto (2004) find a 1 to 2 percentage point increment 
in enrollment for rural students aged 6–13 of a CCT program in Honduras with 
a transfer of US$5 per student per month. In rural Ecuador, Norbert Schady and 
Maria Caridad Araujo (2006) estimate a 3.5 percentage point increase among stu-
dents aged 6–17 for a monthly transfer of US$15. In Mexico, T. Paul Schultz (2004) 
reports a 2.5 percentage point increase in enrollment for boys and 3.5 for girls in 
grades 1–9 for monthly transfers ranging from US$17–US$32 per month per stu-
dent. Finally, Attanasio et al. (2010) assess, with propensity score matching, a simi-
lar program to ours (but one that also includes a nutrition component) run by the 
national Colombian government and find an increase in self-reported enrollment of 
4.8 percentage points for urban children aged 14–17. The monthly transfers ranged 
from US$4.61 to US$9.23. However, these areas are much less developed than 
Bogota, and students have a baseline enrollment rate of only 65 percent.
C. Heterogeneity
To  investigate  the  possibility  of  heterogeneity  in  the  programs’  effects,  we 
decompose the treatment effects based on the students’ gender, income, and pro-
jected probability of attendance and enrollment without the treatment. These results 
are presented in Table 5 and Figures 1–4. Table 5 includes estimates for just the 
basic-savings treatment. The results for the tertiary treatment show the same pattern 
although the differences are not always statistically significant due to the smaller 
sample size.
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We estimate the effects of the treatments by gender in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. 
Column 1 focuses on attendance. Column 2 focuses on enrollment. For attendance, 
both treatments show the same pattern of effects—boys experience gains of about 5 
percentage points, while girls experience much smaller gains. In fact, girls experi-
ence no statistically significant change in attendance due to either treatment. The 
difference in treatment effects by gender is 3.4 percentage points for the basic treat-
ment (significant at the 10 percent level) and 4.5 percentage points for the savings 
treatment (significant at the one percent level). This difference in effects by gender 
may be due to the fact that girls have a 3.2 percentage point higher attendance rate 
than boys absent the treatments. So, the net effect of the treatments is to increase 
Table 5—Variation in the Basic and Savings Treatment Effects, Basic-Savings Experiment
Gender  Income  Projected participation
Attendance  Enrollment  Attendance Enrollment  Attendance  Enrollment
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Basic treatment 0.049*** 0.016 0.067*** 0.031* 0.225*** 0.03
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.078) (0.066)
Savings treatment 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.043** 0.165** 0.153***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.066) (0.055)
Basic × Girl −0.034* −0.011
(0.019) (0.019)




Basic × low income −0.050** −0.029
(0.021) (0.023)
Savings × low income −0.029** −0.006
(0.013) (0.021)
Low income 0.014 0.007
(0.015) (0.018)
Basic × projected enrollment −0.027
(0.085)
Savings × projected enrollment −0.161**
(0.074)
Basic × projected attendance −0.244**
(0.094)
Savings × projected attendance −0.174**
(0.078)
Demographic controls √ √ √ √ √ √
School fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 5,799 8,980 5,799 8,980 5,799 8,980
r
2 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.17
notes: This table displays the results on variation in the treatment effects for the basic and savings treatments from 
Tables 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 2 contain results from interactions with the child’s gender. Columns 3 and 4 con-
tain  results from interactions with income (“low income” is defined as a family earning less than 380,000 pesos or 
US $190 a month, this is the sixty-sixth percentile for income). Columns 5 and 6 contain interactions with the pro-
jected attendance and enrollment variables. Note that all estimations include the same set of control variables, but 
these variables are only reported if they are interacted with the treatment variables to make the table clearer. Control 
variables include all variables listed in Table 2, the square of the child’s age, the number of years too old a child 
is for his or her grade, and indicator variables for the child’s marital status, the family’s marital status, grade, and 
whether or not the child is over the average age for his or her grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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the attendance rate of boys to roughly that of girls.
19 There is no gender difference, 
on the other hand, when it comes to enrollment effects—girls experience the same 
gain from the savings treatment as boys do and experience no gains due to the basic 
treatment just like the boys.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 study heterogeneity by income for attendance and 
enrollment, respectively. In column 3, we estimate equation (2) interacting the treat-
ment indicators with an indicator for whether or not a child’s family falls into the 
bottom two income terciles (earns less than 380,000 pesos or US$190, a month). 
The estimates suggest that both treatments have a large effect on students that are the 
least poor (e.g., those in the top tercile), with the basic treatment increasing atten-
dance by 6.7 percent and the savings treatment increasing attendance by 4.7 per-
centage points (both statistically significant at the 1 percent level). The difference is 
statistically significant, suggesting that for this group of students the savings treat-
ment does offer slightly weaker incentives to attend regularly. Among the poorer 
students, the attendance rates for both treatments are significantly smaller, although 
the treatment effects for these students are still positive and statistically significant. 
The effect of the basic treatment on these students is 1.7 percentage points (signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level), and the effect for the savings treatment is 1.8 percent-
age points (significant at the 5 percent level).
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When it comes to re-enrollment (column 4 of Table 5), the treatments differ. 
We find that both the basic and savings treatment increase enrollment among the 
wealthiest students. The savings treatment increases enrollment by 4.3 percentage 
points and the basic treatment increases enrollment by 3.1 percentage points (the 
difference between these effects is not statistically significant at conventional lev-
els). The interaction terms make it clear that the overall average noneffect of the 
basic treatment on enrollment is being driven by the poorest students in our study. 
The basic treatment effect among these students is 2.9 percentage points smaller 
than among the wealthier students, yielding a statistically insignificant 0.2 percent-
age point increase in enrollment (p-value 0.91). The effect for the savings treatment 
is about the same as it is for the wealthier students. Thus, for all but the wealthiest 
students, the savings treatment has an effect that is 3.4 percentage points greater 
than the savings treatment, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1 per-
cent level (p-value 0.0036).
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Finally, we disaggregate the results by predicted attendance and enrollment rates 
absent the treatment. We estimate these counterfactuals by modeling the behavior 
of students in our control groups using only the available baseline demographic 
characteristics. We then, for all students, use the baseline characteristics and the 
coefficients from the regressions on the control group to project what these students 
would have done had they not been treated. The baseline demographic characteris-
tics we include in the model are the same as in equation (2).
19 There also do not seem to be differential effects of the treatments by gender. Although the decline in the treat-
ment effect for girls is 1.1 percentage points larger for the savings treatment, the difference between the savings 
and basic treatments’ differential gender effects is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value 0.36).
20 These estimates are not presented in the tables, but are available upon request.
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Figure 1 shows the nonparametric regression of monitored attendance rates on 
the predicted attendance rates by research group. The relationship for each treat-
ment is basically identical and suggests gains for students across the distribution. 
However, the gains are largest for the students who are the least likely to attend. This 
is tested in column 5 of Table 5. Controlling for the predicted attendance rates, both 
treatments have similar effects, and these effects are largest for those least likely to 
attend. The effect for students who are very likely to have attended absent the treat-
ment is the sum of the coefficients in row 11 and row 1 (rows 12 and 2 for the sav-
ings treatment). The treatments have no effect on these students. However, the basic 
and savings treatment effects increase by 2.4 and 1.7 percentage points, respectively, 
for every 10 percentage points less a student would have attended absent the treat-
ment. Those unlikely to have attended experienced gains of 22.5 and 16.5 percent-
age points.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution for enrollment. Unlike the effects for attendance, 
the two treatments show different patterns. The basic treatment does not consistently 
generate higher enrollment rates than the control group, while the savings treat-
ment does. Further, the savings treatment generates the largest gains for the students 
with the lowest probability of enrollment. We test these patterns in column 6 of 
Table 5. The savings treatment effect is largest for those projected not to re-enroll 
and decreases by 1.6 percentage points for every 10 percentage point increase in 
projected enrollment. In contrast, we detect no statistically significant effect of the 
basic treatment. Comparing the effects of the two treatments, the difference in the 
slope and level effect are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Further, our 
estimates suggest that for the students most in danger of dropping out (students with 
a probability of re-enrollment below 0.4—the bottom 13.2 percent of the sample), 
the savings treatment increases enrollment by an average of 12.6 percentage points, 
a very large increase.
In summary, both the basic and savings treatments generate significant attendance 
effects for all students, but they appear particularly effective among those with the 
lowest probability of attending absent the treatment. When it comes to enrollment, 
though, the savings treatment generates larger gains than the basic treatment for all 
students, but these gains are much larger for the students with the lowest probability 
of enrollment absent the treatment. Hence, it appears that a conditional cash trans-
fer program that combines incentives for good attendance with help saving for the 
following year is an especially effective strategy for increasing enrollment for the 
poorest and most at risk students.
Analysis of the tertiary treatment is partially constrained by the smaller sample 
size. However, the effects on subsamples of the students seem to be similar to that 
of the savings treatment. In results not presented in this article, we estimated equa-
tions similar to those in Table 5 for the tertiary treatment. The tertiary treatment 
exhibited the same relative effect on girls’ attendance rates as the basic and sav-
ings treatment. We found no statistically significant differences in the effects of the 
22 While there appear to be differences in both the level of the treatment effect and the slope in projected atten-
dance, the differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The p-value on a test of equality of the 
level effects is 0.498, while the p-value on a test of equality of the slopes is 0.51.VoL. 3 no. 2  185 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
program by income, but we did find differential effects by the projected student 
participation rates. Figures 3 and 4 provide the same estimates as Figures 1 and 2—a 
nonparametric regression of the estimated attendance and enrollment rates on the 
projected measures. In both cases, the tertiary treatment has a significantly larger 
effect on the most academically at-risk students. In a specification similar to the one 
in Table 5, columns 5 and 6, the enrollment effect is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level with a 2.2 percentage point larger treatment effect for each 10 percent-
age points less likely a child would have been to attend without the program. The 
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Figure 1. Monitored Attendance by Predicted Attendance Basic-Savings Experiment
note: Results from local polynomial regressions (bandwith = 0.075).
Figure 2. Administrative Enrollment by Predicted Enrollment Basic-Savings Experiment
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IV.  Survey-Based Outcomes
We present three pieces of information from the follow-up survey data. First, we 
replicate the attendance and enrollment outcomes using the self-reported informa-
tion provided by families. Second, for students who were already in their final year 
of secondary school at baseline (grade 11), we compare the treatments’ efficacy in 
Figure 3. Monitored Attendance by Predicted Attendance, Tertiary Experiment
note: Results from local polynomial regressions (bandwith = 0.075).
Figure 4. Administrative Enrollment by Predicted Enrollment, Tertiary Experiment














































0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Predicted Enrollment
Control Tertiary TreatmentVoL. 3 no. 2  187 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
encouraging graduation and matriculation to tertiary institutions. Finally, we report 
the effects of the program on labor market activities.
23
A. self-reported Attendance and Enrollment
In addition to the monitored attendance and administrative enrollment data we 
described above, we also asked students to self-report their attendance and enroll-
ment in 2006. These questions were asked in a standard format. For enrollment we 
asked “Currently, does this person attend school or a university,” and for attendance 
we asked “How many days did you miss school in the last two weeks?.”
24 Given that 
we are confident in the accuracy of the monitored and administrative data, this offers 
an opportunity to assess the quality of this type of self reported data. This question is 
particularly important in the context of conditional cash transfer programs because, 
given the nature of the intervention, families know that the program is designed to 
generate higher levels of participation. This combined with the possible, although 
erroneous, fear that their responses may affect their receipt of the stipends may 
encourage not just over-reporting of participation, but differentially higher over-
reporting by the groups exposed to the treatments.
The results using the self-reported information are provided in Table 6. All esti-
mates are generated using equation (2). Results for self-reported attendance are pro-
vided in columns 1–3 and the results for self-reported enrollment are presented in 
the last three columns. Within each group, the first column provides an estimate for 
the basic-savings experiment, the second for the tertiary experiment, and the final 
column pools the data from grades nine and ten from both experiments. Effectively, 
these estimates reproduce the estimates in columns 3, 6, and 7 in Tables 3 and 4 with 
the self-reported measures.
For every estimated treatment effect, the results are significantly smaller than what 
was estimated using the monitored and administrative data. Only two of the esti-
mates are statistically significant—the tertiary treatment for attendance in column 3 
and the savings treatment for column 6, but the latter is actually negative. The results 
suggest that, rather than overstating the observed treatment effect, the self-reported 
estimates actually significantly understate the effect. The challenge seems to be that 
both the treatment and control groups are subject to significant positive bias in their 
reported participation rates, and because the rates are capped at 100 percent, the dif-
ference between the groups is compressed. For example, in the basic-savings experi-
ment, the attendance rates in the self-reported data are 95 percent but only 79 percent 
in the monitored data. In the same experiment, students report re-enrollment at rates 
of 98 percent, but the administrative data suggest that the real rate is only 74 percent.
23 As described in Section IIC, overall attrition rate on the follow-up survey was extremely low (less than 2 per-
cent across all experimental groups). In the online Appendix, we also compare the subsample of students from the 
68 schools identified for surveying to those we omitted, and compare individuals identified for surveying across 
research groups. No significant differences were found across any comparison.
24 Slight care must be taken in comparing these results to the monitored attendance data because they relate to 
different years. The monitored data relates to 2005, while the self-reported data is for 2006. However, given the 
nature of the results, this is unlikely to be the source of the discrepancy.188  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
These results suggest that self-reported measures may bias the observed treat-
ment effects downward. That said, this is the first study that, to our knowledge, has 
yielded such uniformly high self-reported participation rates. It does suggest that 
monitored data, though expensive, may be the best strategy for assessing participa-
tion levels. At the very least, this suggests that one needs to be particularly careful 
in interpreting estimates based on self-reported results.
B. graduation and Tertiary Enrollment
Keeping in mind the caveats from the previous section, we analyze the effects of 
each intervention on self-reported graduation and tertiary enrollment
25 for students 
who were in their last year of secondary school at the start of the study (grade 11).
The results are presented in Table 7. All estimates are based on equation (2). The 
layout of the table is identical to that of Table 6, except that the first three columns 
focus on graduation and the second three on tertiary enrollment. All the estimated 
treatment effects on graduation are positive. For the savings and tertiary treatments, 
25 Given the data available to us, we cannot break down the type of institution, but discussions with the program 
staff indicate that students largely enrolled in vocational education programs.
Table 6—Effects on Self-Reported Attendance and Enrollment Rates, Grades 6–10
Self-reported attendance Self-reported enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic treatment  0.006 −0.003 0.001 −0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Savings treatment  0.007 0.003 0.001 −0.012*
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Tertiary treatment 0.021 0.022* 0.007 0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
H0: Basic—Savings
  f-Stat  0.17 1.41 0.01 1.11
  p-value 0.68 0.24 0.91 0.30
H0: Tertiary—Savings
  f-Stat 3.23 2.28
  p-value 0.08 0.14
Demographic controls  √  √  √  √  √  √
School fixed effects  √  √  √  √  √  √
Observations  5,239  860  2,663  5,135  803  2,590
r
2  0.03  0.11  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.05
Control average  0.954  0.941  0.957  0.982  0.988  0.988
Sample  Basic-savings  Tertiary  Both  Basic-savings  Tertiary  Both
notes: This table presents the results of estimates of the treatment effect for each treatment on students’ self-
reported attendance rates (columns 1–3) and enrollment rates (columns 4–6). Columns 1 and 4 contain only stu-
dents in the basic-savings experiment. Columns 2 and 5 contain students in the tertiary experiment, and columns 3 
and 6 contain students in both experiments in grades 9 and 10. All samples include only students who completed 
both the baseline and follow-up surveys. Control variables include all variables listed in Table 2, the square of the 
child’s age, the number of years too old a child is for his or her grade, and indicator variables for the child’s marital 
status, the family’s marital status, grade, and whether or not the child is over the average age for his or her grade. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
    * Significant at the 10 percent level.VoL. 3 no. 2  189 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
the magnitudes are similar to the administrative enrollment effects observed in 
Table 4. For the basic treatment, though, we observe larger magnitudes here than 
in Table 4. That said, none of these effects are statistically significant, most likely 
because sample sizes are significantly smaller than in prior tables. If we pool the 
treatments, the overall average treatment effect is 4.0 percentage points, and it is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level (p-value 0.09).
The effects on tertiary enrollment, however, are both positive and statistically 
significant for the savings and tertiary treatments. Recall that the tertiary treatment 
specifically incentivized enrollment in tertiary institutions both by providing a sub-
stantial transfer to students in the year after they graduated and by making the pay-
ment sooner if the students could document enrollment. The savings treatment, on 
the other hand, did not have any direct relationship with tertiary enrollment but 
did provide the families of students a transfer at the time that students would nor-
mally have to register. Looking first at the basic-savings experiment in column 4, 
the savings treatment increased tertiary enrollment by 9.4 percentage points (sta-
tistically significant at the 5 percent level), while the effect of the basic treatment 
is also positive but statistically insignificant. While the difference in the magnitude 
of effects is larger than the difference observed in Table 4 for administrative enroll-
ment, the difference is not statistically significant (p-value is 0.19). The effect we 
estimate for the tertiary treatment is extremely large, an increase of 48.9 percentage 
Table 7—Effects on Graduation and Tertiary Enrollment for Students in Grade 11
Graduation Tertiary enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic treatment  0.039 0.036 0.043 0.048
(0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.033)
Savings treatment  0.04 0.039 0.094** 0.094***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033)
Tertiary treatment 0.047 0.044 0.489*** 0.487***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.039) (0.041)
H0: Basic—Savings
  f-Stat  <​0.01 0.01 1.82 1.57
  p-value 0.99 0.94 0.19 0.22
H0: Tertiary—Savings
  f-Stat 0.02 76.70
  p-value 0.88 <​0.01
Demographic controls  √  √  √  √  √  √
School fixed effects  √  √  √  √  √  √
Observations  529  297  826  513  290  803
r
2  0.1  0.15  0.1  0.09 0.37  0.21
Control average  0.874  0.902 0.887  0.2192  0.189 0.205
Sample  Basic-savings  Tertiary  Both  Basic-savings  Tertiary  Both
notes: This table presents the results of estimates of the treatment effects on students’ self-reported graduation rates 
(columns 1–3) and tertiary enrollment rates (columns 4–6) for students enrolled in grade 11 at the start of the study. 
Columns 1 and 4 contain only students in the basic-savings experiment. Columns 2 and 5 contain students in the 
tertiary experiment, and columns 3 and 6 contain students in both experiments. All samples include only students 
who completed both the baseline and follow-up surveys. Control variables include all variables listed in Table 2, the 
square of the child’s age, the number of years too old a child is for his or her grade, and indicator variables for the 
child’s marital status, the family’s marital status, grade, and whether or not the child is over the average age for his 
or her grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
    * Significant at the 10 percent level.190  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
points, and statistically significantly different from the effect of the basic treatment 
(p-value < 0.001).
Given the extremely large effect observed for the tertiary treatment and the self-
reporting issues we discussed in the previous section, it is reasonable to ask whether 
these tertiary enrollment findings are credible. In particular, are students in the sav-
ings and tertiary treatment groups lying about being enrolled in tertiary institutions? 
At first glance, the savings treatment effect appears much more believable. It is 
of the same order of magnitude as the administrative enrollment effect in Table 4. 
Plus, because the timing of transfers under the savings treatment are not described 
to families as being conditional on enrolling in a tertiary institution, families should 
not have experienced pressure to misreport enrollment, even if they misunderstood 
the surveyors’ instructions.
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For the tertiary treatment, though, it is more difficult to rule out the possibility that 
the treated students gave surveyors the answer that they thought was desired. Yet, 
if families in the tertiary treatment group are lying, they seem to do so very consis-
tently throughout the follow-up survey. Indeed, the observed rate of tertiary enroll-
ment increases to three times the control average of 18.9 percentage points. In Table 
8, we will see a similar tripling in the fraction of children whose primary activity is 
reported to be studying. In addition, the self-reported graduation rates (a pre-requi-
site for tertiary enrollment) seem to match the estimates based on the administrative 
enrollment data and verified attendance data. First, the levels reported by families 
are consistent with the administrative data. The administrative enrollment rates for 
students completing the baseline survey in grades 9 and 10 is 85 percent for both 
experiments, and it increases by grade. These rates would be consistent with the 
reported graduation rates of 87 and 90 percent among grade 11 students. Also, the 
estimated treatment effects for self-reported enrollment are in line with those esti-
mated for administrative enrollment and verified attendance.
C. Labor market Activity
In the follow-up survey, we also collected information on labor market outcomes, 
which we present in Table 8. Since students initially in grade 11 should have finished 
school by the time the survey was conducted, we isolate grade 11 in panel B and 
pool the earlier grades in panel A. In columns 1 and 4, we report control group aver-
ages for each experiment. Columns 2, 3, and 5 contain the estimated effect for the 
respective treatment, using equation (2). The first three rows in each panel indicate 
the primary activity of the child (studying, work, or taking care of the household), 
while the last two rows show the number of hours worked in the last week that the 
child worked and the amount of money earned during that week (in 1,000s of pesos).
For those in the earlier grades at the time of registration, there is not much of a 
change in self-reported primary activities, but there is a relatively large, consistent 
decrease in the number of hours worked among treated children. The basic and 
26 Families were informed, before starting the survey, that their answers would not affect their participation in 
the program and that the data would not be provided to the SED.VoL. 3 no. 2  191 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
savings treatments reduce the amount worked by about one-third, while the tertiary 
treatment has a much larger effect, reducing hours worked by more than a half or 
0.8 hours in the last week worked. Earnings are less precisely estimated, but show 
the same pattern of results.
Turning to panel B, we observe no detectable effects on labor market activities in 
the basic-savings experiment for students initially in grade 11. In contrast, and con-
sistent with the very large tertiary enrollment effects reported in Table 7, the tertiary 
treatment appears to shift students away from labor market work and toward educa-
tional institutions. Forty-three percent more students report that their primary activ-
ity is studying (a tripling consistent with the tripling in tertiary enrollment reported 
in Table 7), and these students seem equally drawn from those who would have 
otherwise been working or helping around the house. On average, students work 
7.3 hours less a week and earn 12,000 pesos less.













Panel A. Labor activities, grades 6–10
Primary activity, studying
a 0.936 −0.003  0.003  0.904  0.013
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.018)
Primary activity, work  0.008  −0.002  −0.001  0.009  −0.008*
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)
Primary activity, home  0.007  0.001  0.003  0  0.003
(0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.003)
Hours worked last work week 0.922  −0.371**  −0.248*  1.5  −0.804**
  (0.130) (0.160)  (0.142)  (0.311)  (0.390)
Earnings last work week 1.263  −0.294  −0.35  1.865  −0.7
(0.212)  (0.293)  (0.213)  (0.362)  (0.605)
Panel B. Labor activities, grade 11
Primary activity, studying
a  0.299  0.038  0.038  0.235  0.436***
(0.035)  (0.061)  (0.046)  (0.034)  (0.043)
Primary activity, work  0.155  −0.004  0.031  0.248  −0.153***
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.056)  (0.035)  (0.051)
Primary activity, home  0.172  0.008  0.017  0.222  −0.183***
(0.029)  (0.041)  (0.055)  (0.034)  (0.031)
Hours worked last work week 7.052  0.683  0.092  8.425  −7.349***
(1.293)  (1.849)  (1.685)  (1.478)  (1.453)
Earnings last work week 10.04  1.196  2.33  16.408  −12.089**
(1.949)  (3.290)  (2.656)  (3.387)  (5.347)
notes: This table presents the estimated treatment effects of the three treatments on labor market outcomes col-
lected from the student follow-up survey. All regressions include both controls for student demographic character-
istics and school level fixed effects. Control variables include all variables listed in Table 2, the square of the child’s 
age, the number of years too old a child is for his or her grade, and indicator variables for the child’s marital status, 
the family’s marital status, grade, and whether or not the child is over the average age for his or her grade. Standard 
errors are clustered at the school level. 
a Percentages for each primary activity do not add to 100 percent because two categories are omitted 
  (incapacitated, and other activities).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
    * Significant at the 10 percent level.192  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
V.  Sibling Effects
Having a child enrolled in a CCT program may affect outcomes for his or her sib-
lings. On the one hand, the additional resources brought in by the CCT program may 
improve educational opportunities for his or her siblings as families spread these 
new resources across children. On the other hand, if some children are preferred, the 
receipt of a CCT by these children could reinforce those preferences, resulting in 
resources being less equally distributed than before. While we do not have sufficient 
data to fully unpack the decision process within the family, the intra-family variation 
in treatment assignment does provide a reduced form test of whether receiving the 
transfer changes the allocation of educational opportunities within the household.
The first decision families faced was whether to enroll a child in the lottery. 
Surprisingly, not all eligible children were enrolled, suggesting that families may 
have preferences about which children to educate. On average, the 6,619 families 
who completed a follow-up survey had 2.5 kids in the appropriate age range to 
enroll in the lottery, but only enrolled 1.3 children. Looking only at the responses of 
families who ended up in the control group, 93 percent of the children registered for 
the lottery reportedly attend school at the time of the follow-up survey, compared 
with only 75 percent of the children that were also eligible but were not registered. 
This is despite the significant over-reporting of enrollment rates observed in the pre-
vious section. Similarly, registered children work 3.1 hours less a week (1.4 hours 
versus 4.6 hours in the last week worked) than eligible but nonregistered children. 
Hence, this suggests that even absent the CCT, families do not treat all their children 
equally. This also implies that in order to study causal spillovers of program partici-
pation by one child on nonparticipating siblings, we need to restrict ourselves to the 
subset of siblings that were also registered.
Unfortunately, most families (5,132) only registered one child, and very few reg-
istered more than two (158). In Tables 9 and 10, we focus on families who registered 
two children, providing a sample of 1,926 students, 1,771 with available adminis-
trative enrollment data. We also restrict ourselves to using our two preferred out-
comes—monitored attendance and administrative enrollment—and only rely on the 
surveys to map the children’s sibling relationships. All results are estimated using a 
specification similar to equation (2). Due to the small sample size, we pool the treat-
ments rather than analyze them individually.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 contain comparisons of untreated children with and 
without treated siblings using the monitored attendance and administrative enroll-
ment data, respectively. On average, untreated children with treated siblings have 
lower participation rates than untreated children whose siblings are also untreated. 
Attendance is lower by 3 percentage points and enrollment is 7.3 percentage points 
lower. The next four columns further break the comparison down by gender—first 
estimating the effect for untreated girls in columns 3 and 4 and then for untreated 
boys in columns 5 and 6. The effect is qualitatively similar for both genders, though 
the magnitude is stronger and only statistically significant at conventional levels for 
girls.
All in all, untreated children appear, if anything, to see their educational outcomes 
deteriorate if one of their siblings becomes a CCT recipient. This is inconsistent VoL. 3 no. 2  193 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
Table 9—Effects of Treatment on Siblings Using Monitored and Administrative Participation, 
Households with Two Registered Children
Untreated children  Female control Male control
Attendance  Enrollment  Attendance  Enrollment  Attendance  Enrollment
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Sibling is treated?   −0.030*  −0.073***  −0.053**  −0.104*  −0.029  −0.054
​ (yes or no) (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.054)  (0.031)  (0.040)
Child is treated?  
  (yes or no)
Demographic controls  √  √  √  √  √  √
School fixed effects  √  √  √  √  √  √
Observations  690  637  352  323  338  314
r
2  0.28  0.16  0.33  0.23  0.38  0.26
Sample description Untreated children in 
households with two 
registered children
Untreated girls in  
households with two 
treated children
Untreated boys in  
households with two 
treated children
notes: This table presents estimates of within family externalities using monitored attendance and administrative 
enrollment as outcomes. All estimates include only children in households that registered two children for the lot-
tery. Columns 1 and 2 compare children who did not receive a treatment but with treated sibling versus untreated 
children with untreated siblings. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample in columns 1 and 2 to the subset of girls, while 
columns 5 and 6 restrict it to the subset of boys. Family relationships are based on the student survey. Control vari-
ables include all variables listed in Table 2, the square of the child’s age, the number of years too old a child is for 
his or her grade, and indicator variables for the child’s marital status, the family’s marital status, grade, and whether 
or not the child is over the average age for his or her grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
    * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 10—Within Family Effects of Treated Siblings, Households  
with Two Registered Children
One treated child  Treated children
Attendance  Enrollment  Attendance  Enrollment
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Sibling is treated? (yes or no)  0.007  −0.001
(0.009)  (0.021)
Child is treated? (yes or no)  0.014  0.033*
(0.012)  (0.018)
Demographic controls  √  √  √  √
School fixed effects  √  √  √  √
Observations  885  827  1,236  1,134
r
2  0.57  0.17  0.75  0.14
Sample description Children in households  
with one treated and  
one untreated child
Treated children in  
households with two  
registered children
notes: This table presents estimates of within family externalities using monitored attendance 
and administrative enrollment as outcomes. All estimates include only children in households 
that registered two children for the lottery. Columns 1 and 2 compare the participation rates of 
children who are treated to those who are not in households in which only one child is treated. 
Columns 3 and 4 compare treated children whose siblings are also treated to treated children 
whose siblings are not treated. Family relationships are based on the student survey. Control 
variables include all variables listed in Table 2, the square of the child’s age, the number of 
years too old a child is for his or her grade, and indicator variables for the child’s marital sta-
tus, the family’s marital status, grade, and whether or not the child is over the average age for 
his or her grade. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
    * Significant at the 10 percent level.194  AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: APPLiEd Economics  APriL 2011
with the view that the additional household resources generated by the CCT pro-
gram are used to invest in the education of the untreated children. In fact, families 
with a treated child appear to take some educational inputs (resources, monitoring, 
etc) away from the untreated children.
The estimates presented in Table 10 further support this interpretation. Columns 1 
and 2 compare the participation rates of untreated children to their treated siblings 
in households that received only one treatment. As expected, the treated siblings 
have higher participation rates, though the effect is only significant for enrollment. 
Columns 3 and 4 compare treated children with untreated siblings to treated chil-
dren who also have treated siblings. Unlike what one would expect if resources were 
equalized, the treated children with untreated siblings perform just as well as the 
treated children with treated siblings.
VI.  Conclusion
This project demonstrates that experimenting with the design of incentive pro-
grams may have substantial benefits in terms of the efficacy of these programs. For 
the education programs we evaluate, simply postponing some of the cash transfers 
to a large lump-sum, paid at the time when the re-enrollment decision is made (and 
re-enrollment expenses incurred), increases enrollment in both secondary and ter-
tiary institutions without reducing daily attendance. This is particularly true for the 
poorest students and those most at-risk of dropping out. This suggests that there 
is much to gain in designing CCTs that better take into account the financial chal-
lenges many families may face, such as difficulties saving money, in addition to the 
more common focus on short-term liquidity constraints.
Also, incentivizing on graduation rather than just attendance is shown to be par-
ticularly effective, leading to higher levels of daily attendance and higher levels of 
enrollment at the secondary and tertiary levels. The results indicate that the specific 
behaviors cash transfers are conditioned on should be chosen more carefully.
Another important dimension in the design of educational incentive programs is 
deciding on eligibility rules. In this regard, our intriguing results regarding within-
family dynamics suggest that eligibility rules that cut across children rather than just 
across families (for example, restricting eligibility to certain age groups rather than 
to certain household income groups) may have unintended consequences. In par-
ticular, we find that children that registered for the program, but were not selected 
for treatment, end up attending school less if one of their siblings was treated than 
if that sibling was also untreated. This suggests that families might redirect some of 
their prior educational investments away from program-ineligible children, leading 
to increased inequality in educational attainment within the household. Of course, 
the treatments increase the overall resources available to families, and we cannot 
rule out future transfers from educated to noneducated siblings that would more 
equally distribute the welfare gains. However, this result, which is strongest for 
girls, unambiguously suggests that the ways in which families mediate the alloca-
tion of educational opportunities should be an important area for future research.VoL. 3 no. 2  195 BArrErA-osorio ET AL.: imProVing condiTionAL TrAnsfEr ProgrAms
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